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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the gradual improvement in key economic indicators during the past 18 months, 
prospects over the next two years and especially in the medium term remain largely uncertain. 
This prediction stems from the conflicting signals being received by the business sector concern­
ing the status of the economy. There has been renewed confidence in the Philippine economy 
resulting from the smooth transition of government that followed the peaceful and credible elec­
tions held last May 1992 and the efforts of the new administration to continue the program of en­
hancing the openness and competitiveness of the economy. The policy of completely liberalizing 
regulations governing foreign exchange transactions is a case in point. Exporters are now al­
lowed to keep all the proceeds from their activities; previously, the retention limit was a mere two 
percent before it was raised to 40 percent.
The economy, however, continues to be hampered by chronic structural problems which have 
been compounded by the effects of natural disasters. A major concern of investors is the frequent 
power outages which inhibit growth. With interest payments on external and domestic debt ab­
sorbing a large chunk of the government’s budget, investment spending as well as operating and 
maintenance expenditures have been cut back drastically during the last two years in order for the 
government to meet the fiscal targets dictated by the stabilization program. This has only exacer­
bated the dismal situation. The ceilings on financial aggregates have led to tight monetary policy 
and raising interest rates (both nominal and real) which in turn have led to higher debt service on 
domestic obligations and an appreciating currency. The stronger peso has elicited protests from 
the export sector and if this trend continues, it will only subsidize imports and discourage invest­
ments from flowing into export-oriented industries.
At present, the government must overcome the fiscal constraint to be able to jump start the 
economy and effectively address the existing infrastructure problems. Unfortunately, the budget 
for 1993 continues to neglect the need for adequate investment spending. Government construc­
tion i t ’-even predicted to decline in real terms. There have been proposals to finance additional 
expenditures in the short-term by increasing money supply. While this may be inflationary, 
simulations have shown that the economy would still expand. Inflation forecasts for next year
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2range from 7-8 percent and by historical standards 10 percent would certainly be tolerable. The 
long-term solution, of course, is to increase revenues and the general consensus among economic 
analysts is that there is little need for new tax measures; instead efforts must concentrate on mini­
mizing tax evasion.
A three-gap analysis (Bacha 1990, and Lim 1990) reveals that in many developing countries, 
the current fiscal constraints originate from a drop in external transfers to the economy. In other 
words, the economies originally confront a foreign exchange constraint which drains the foreign 
exchange reserves. When these reserves are exhausted, "government investment would be cut off 
and stiff foreign exchange controls introduced. The latter would crowd private investment 
out....The next stage would consist of a reaction of exports, making use of the accumulated slack 
in the domestic economy....At the end of the medium-term adjustment process further growth of 
the economy would be bound by the fiscal constraint." (Bacha 1990:291).
The Philippines experienced a foreign exchange constraint after the external debt crisis in 
1983. Efforts to cope with the repercussions led to a severe recession in 1984-1985. Unlike 
countries with a strong export base (e.g. Brazil), the foreign exchange constraint was overcome 
not by an increase in exports but by relying on official credit, remittances of overseas workers, 
and rapid inflow of foreign investment in 1988-89 that followed the implementation of the debt- 
equity swap mechanisms. Moreover, quasi-fiscal functions of the Central Bank effectively sub­
stituted domestic debt for external obligations. As a result, total outstanding public sector internal 
debt rose from $6 billion in 1985 to $12 billion in 1991. Actually, it is this move combined with 
tight monetary policy that is the primary source of the fiscal woes of the current administration. 
In a sense, the economy has been prey to a double crowding out phenomenon: "On the one hand, 
tight monetary policies and domestic borrowing raise interest rates for the private sector and 
crowd out private investments. On the other hand, the strictures on the fiscal deficit, together 
with a rising bill for debt service, also crowds out the more productive and socially oriented parts 
of the national government’s budget." (De Dios 1992:5)
A crucial issue then that must be resolved is whether the Philippines has effectively hurdled 
the foreign exchange constraint. For even if the government is able to pump prime the economy 
out of its present languor, unless there has been significant structural change, it will run anew into 
a brick wall completing another boom-bust cycle. Some economic analysts have declared that 
the structural reforms of the 1980s have completed the removal of the foreign exchange con­
straint that had seriously impeded economic growth in the past. Such a sanguine conclusion is 
absent, however, in other studies. It seems that the more pessimistic view is in this case, the 
more accurate it is.
In this respect, the theme of the next Medium Term Philippine Development Plan which aims 
for world competitiveness and human development is quite appropriate. Judging from these 
catch phrases, the thrust for the next five years would be a smaller but more focused role for the 
government and an emphasis on efficiency with the drive for export production in the cutting 
edge. Indeed the economy must be effectively restructured. Otherwise, the gap between the 
foreign exchange constraint and fiscal constraint will narrow without being substantially relaxed, 
leaving the Philippines to contend with low equilibrium growth in the future.
3II. RECENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1992)
A. Economic Growth and Sectoral Performance
Based on the latest semestral indicator, the Philippine economy failed to break the "low- 
growth" scenario that has characterized its performance since the turn of the decade. Aggregate 
output (GNP) grew by 0.5 percent as compared to the 0.4 percent growth in the immediately 
preceding semester. While this was an improvement from the 0.6 percent decline of the economy 
during the first semester of 1991, this upturn should be regarded with great caution, noting that 
the economy was in a slump at the start of the year. Nonetheless, the mild recovery came from 
the slight increase in investments and exports as well as the more than 100 percent increase in the 
net factor income from abroad — mainly consisting of workers’ remittances. Year-end GNP 
growth is estimated at 0.9 percent.
Analogous with this slight achievement, domestic production (GDP) declined by 0.4 percent 
during the first semester of this year. However, this is still much better than the 1.2 percent con­
traction during the same period last year.
In general, this bleak picture was a result of supply side slippages arising from natural and 
man-made disasters. Prolonged drought aggravated by the continuous flows of volcanic debris 
reduced agricultural production. Recurring power outages which adversely affected industrial 
production during the first semester is expected to continue for the rest of the year, thus stagnat­
ing industrial growth estimate 0.1 percent. Year-end growth in the services sector is seen at 0.3 
percent. With these factors, GDP is expected to grow by only 0.1 percent in 1992.
Looking at the expenditure components, investments and exports posted notable growth rates 
during the first semester at 8.6 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively. These figures offset the 
decline in private construction and breeding stock and orchard development which registered at 
12.0 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively.
Capital formation grew by more than 20 percent during the second quarter because of invest­
ments in durable equipment and expenditures on public construction which grew by 11.4 percent 
and 26.5 percent, respectively. However, the increase in public construction emanated from the 
completion of stalled infrastructure projects and the rehabilitation efforts in Central Luzon. On 
the other hand, the rise in the purchase of durable equipment stemmed from importation of ener­
gy related machineries such as generators and gas turbines. As such, these factors are hardly sus­
tainable. In the medium term, the real value of public construction will decline and the firms’ 
reliance upon self- generation of power will lead to waste, inefficiency and increasing cost of 
production.
Moreover, as a result of the lifting of the import levy and the liberalization of regulations on 
foreign exchange holdings, exports accelerated growth at 9.4 percent for the first semester of 
1992. This can be attributed to the rapid growth of merchandise exports at 9.2 percent. The top 
earners under this group were semiconductors and garments which have a combined share of 
over 40 percent of total exports. In dollar terms, merchandise exports grew at 8.2 percent for the 
first semester of 1992.
4However, with the low "value-added" nature of Philippine merchandise exports and their de­
pendency upon the weak markets in the industrialized world, this rosy export performance can 
hardly contribute to progress. Effects of the currency appreciation are expected to pull down ex­
ports during the second semester. For 1992, exports of goods and services are estimated to grow 
by 6.8 percent.
Total consumption during the first half of the year contributed substantially to GDP growth as 
it posted a 3.2 percent growth. This resulted from election-related expenditures, the rehabilitation 
of lahar-stricken provinces and the additional purchases induced by renewed confidence and the 
decelerated inflation.
However, due to the accelerated growth in imports, the above- mentioned developments did 
not result in a higher GDP growth. Growth of real imports surpassed that of real exports. The 
outflow of goods and services ensued from the strengthening of the peso and the phase-out of the 
import levy. These developments pushed up the imports of goods by 16.3 percent and the im­
ports of non-factor services by 20.7 percent. By the end of the year, growth in imports of goods 
and services is estimated to taper off and settle at 15.8 percent.
Except for the services sector, there was a general slowdown in the production side of the 
economy during the first semester of 1992. Both the agricultural and the industrial sectors were 
greatly affected by natural and man-made disasters. First, there was the prolonged drought and 
the frequent breakdown of existing power plants which exacerbated the power crisis. Second, the 
extended dry season substantially damaged agriculture performance because of the delayed plant­
ing and harvesting of crops. Finally, the continuing wrath of Mt. Pinatubo reduced rice and com 
production by 27 percent in the second quarter of this year.
Overall, agricultural production declined by 2.6 percent for the first semester of this year as 
compared to the 3.2 percent growth during the same period last year. Enforcement of the log ban 
and nature conservation measures have contributed to the accelerated decline in forestry output 
by 48 percent. Similarly, the red tide scare caused the fishery sector to contract by 0.4 percent. 
Hence, a contraction of 0.2 percent is expected for agricultural production which is a turnabout 
from last year’s growth of 0.7 percent.
In the industrial sector, which comprises more than one-third of total output, production fell 
by 0.4 percent during the first semester of this year. This is an improvement over the 5.8 percent 
drop recorded for the same period last year. Industrial production during the semester was dam­
pened by the power crisis which peaked during the second quarter of this year. The power 
shortage suppressed manufacturing activities causing big losses to almost three-fourths of the 
major manufacturing industry groups. Among the industrial subsectors, only mining and quarry­
ing grew by three percent due to the remarkable crude oil produce in West Linapacan and the en­
hanced world prices of soft metals. It is expected that industrial output for the whole year will 
grow by only 0.1 percent, an improvement over last year when this sector contracted by 3.1 per­
cent.
In the construction subsector, the immediate completion of stalled infrastructure projects has 
boosted public construction activities as it grew by 26.5 percent during this period. However, this 
was offset by the 12 percent deceleration in private construction coming from the high cost of
5construction materials particularly cement. As a result, output for the whole construction sector 
shrank by 1.1 percent.
In the utilities subsector, the power crisis complemented by increases in utility rates has 
reduced the sale of electricity gas and water. In turn this contributed to the 2.8 percent decline in 
output. This is a reversal from the 1.5 percent expansion recorded last year.
Meanwhile, the services sector demonstrated flexibility amidst a climate of economic difficul­
ties as it managed to accelerate growth to 0.7 percent from 0.4 percent last year. Major sources 
of growth were transport, communication and storage and trade subsectors. This sector is ex­
pected to perform well for the rest of the year as it is estimated to grow by 0.3 percent compared 
with last year’s growth of 0.04 percent.
B. Employment
An encouraging employment scenario was manifested despite the shaky performance of the 
domestic economy in the first half of 1992.
Figures from the National Statistics Office (NSO) show that the labor sector is slowly 
recovering from the slump it experienced last year. First, the growth in employment (1.6 %) sur­
passed the growth in the labor force (-0.1 %). Consequently, the unemployment rate declined. 
Second, the underemployment rate declined implying a greater number of workers with full-time 
work. Underemployment rate was recorded at 21.45 percent for the first semester of 1992 com­
pared to 23.6 percent last year. However, this favorable circumstance remains to be weak as un­
employment and underemployment continued to log double-digit rates.
On a sectoral level, employment in construction posted the highest growth rate of 7.5 percent 
while employment in real estate and financing firms had the largest drop at 6.6 percent. As busi­
ness confidence was renewed, construction activities propelled job creation and inched up 
employment statistics in this sector. Moreso, the surge in election-related spending countervailed 
the negative effect of power outages on employment. Agricultural employment also posted en­
couraging growth of 3.1 percent. The rest of the industrial sector also posted positive growth 
rates in the employment level, except for utilities (-5.0 %), wholesale and retail trade (-2.1 %) , 
and community services (-0.8 %).
On a regional basis, employment increased except for the Cordilleras, Southern Tagalog, and 
Western Visayas. However, the National Capital Region registered the highest unemployment 
rate as the slow pace of regional industrialization and employment generation continue to push 
workers to seek more jobs in the metropolis.
Noteworthy is the ongoing reconstruction effort in the Middle East which creates consider­
able demand for overseas workers and ease up the pressure on the labor market.
C. Savings and Investment
The private sector initiative towards self-generation boosted capital accumulation during the 
first six months of 1992. Gross domestic capital formation grew by 8.6 percent during the first 
semester of 1992 as against the 22.4 percent drop during a comparable period last year. This 
turnabout was made possible by the surge in the accumulation of durable equipments. Invest­
6ment in fixed assets expanded by 11.4 percent during the first semester of 1992, up from the 22.4 
percent drop last year. This capital build-up was basically energy-related as evident in the con­
struction of Hopewell Power plant, Turbotech Philippines Incorporated, and an oil refinery of 
Shell Gas Philippines.
Construction activities have also improved albeit at a slower pace. They rose by 0.6 percent 
during the first semester of 1992 as compared to its 31.7 percent fall last year. Construction ac­
tivities focused on the rehabilitation of areas devastated by earthquakes, volcanic eruption, and 
floods; the setting up of industrial estates and export processing centers; and the completion of 
stalled infrastructure projects.
In terms of domestic savings, the country saved a moderate amount of P46 billion, during the 
first six months of 1992. This is 18.5 percent lower than the 1991 savings. In general, the weak 
mobilization of resources arose from: (1) the increase in total consumption expenditure; (2) the 
low level of aggregate output; and (3) the low return on savings deposit. With this low level of 
savings, the country tapped foreign investments to finance its development expenditures.
Among the foreign investors, the Japanese had the highest number of projects and foreign 
paid-up capital. From December 1991 to April 1992, Japanese investments registered a total of 
14 out of the 51 projects (27.5 % registered and this accounted for 49.7 percent share in the total 
foreign paid-up capital. Most of the Japanese investments went to the manufacturing of electrical 
parts, telecommunications, and automobiles.
The country’s investment picture is expected to be enhanced with the revision of constitution­
al regulations on land ownership and the drawing-up of operational guidelines for the implemen­
tation of RA 6975 or the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law. Hand in hand with the 
government’s thrust to improve the state of physical as well as social infrastructures, these 
favorable developments will definitely encourage foreign investments.
D. Budget, Money and Prices
A sharp fall in consumer prices was evident in 1992. Inflation rate stood at only 9.1 percent 
during the first three quarters of 1992, down from the double digit level of 18.6 percent last year.
By commodity classification, the housing and repair index posted the highest inflation at 18.2 
percent, while fuel, light and water index had the lowest incremental change. This occurred 
despite the power and water rate hikes implemented early this year and the phase-out of MERAL- 
CO subsidy for those consuming greater than 300 kilowatt hour (kwh), beginning last February. 
The price slowdown in the fuel, light and water component was partly due to the April 1992 oil 
price rollback which averaged 4.4 percent, and the continuous downtrend in the currency ex­
change rate adjustment (CERA) in electricity billings.
Monthly changes in the consumer price index reveal decreasing increments beginning 
February this year when inflation rate movements were kept below 10 percent. The conservative 
monetary policy combined with favorable economic expectations countered inflationary pres­
sures arising from the power and water rate adjustments, supply bottlenecks due to drought and 
the Mt. Pinatubo calamity, as well as the increased election-related spending.
7This year, acceleration in prices occurred only when inflation rose from 8.7 percent in April 
to 9.2 percent in May. This figure remained at that level until July. Inflation did not weaken 
during those three consecutive months because of the bigger amount of money in circulation. 
Money supply increased during that time because of the infusion of election money, which was 
estimated at P10 billion. Aiming to bring down inflation from the 9.2 percent level, the monetary 
authorities labored at mopping up excess liquidity and were successful in pulling down price 
changes to 8.9 percent in August and 8.5 percent in September. Full year average inflation is es­
timated at 9.1 percent as the full effect of the decreased fuel prices in October will be felt towards 
the end of the year.
In order to stabilize prices at single-digit levels, the country instituted a prudent monetary 
program. This was manifested through the increased issuance of treasury bills in the weekly auc­
tion, from P 8.5 billion in March to P 10 billion in June. At the same time, there was a significant 
accumulation in national government deposits with the Central Bank, increasing by as much as 
98 percent from the end of December in 1991 to the end of June in 1992.
As of June 1992, the restraint on money resulted in little growth of base money at 13.9 per­
cent. However, the growth of reserve money was much higher at 21.3 percent for the entire first 
semester of 1992, compared with 19 percent during a comparable period last year. Despite the 
contractionary measures adopted by the authorities to set monetary aggregates within target 
levels, both the reserve money and the monetary base exceeded their programmed levels starting 
March 1992. This can be ascribed to CB intervention aimed at maintaining the parity rate of the 
peso — the dollar purchases of the CB inject additional liquidity into the system.
Apart from this deflationary objective, the augmented issuances of treasury bills and notes 
had been used to finance the national government budget deficit. The level of budget deficit fell 
by 63.8 percent from PI 1.41 billion as of September 1991 to only P4.133 billion during the same 
period this year. However, this is P935 million higher than the programmed shortfall for the first 
three quarters of this year.
Actual national government revenue collections reached P176.12 billion—3.1 percent short of 
the programmed P181.8 billion revenue collection for January to September 1992. Yet, this is 
14.7 percent higher than the recorded P153.55 billion revenue last year. Almost half of the 
revenue shortfall ensued from the lower trade duties. In addition, the poor performance of the 
Bureau of Customs was due to the early lifting of the five percent import levy in May and the 
continued appreciation of the currency this year.
Among the revenue-generating agencies, only the Bureau of Treasury exceeded the 
programmed collections. Its net revenue of P I3.7 billion surpassed both the P9.35 billion 
programmed collection for the first three quarters of the 1992 and the P12.61 billion target for the 
whole of 1992. This excellent performance of the Bureau of Treasury, however, was not enough 
to push total revenues to reach its targets. This revenue shortfall is the reason behind the deficit 
which was greater than the target for the first three quarters of the current year.
Spending-wise, the first nine months was characterized by fiscal deflation. Actual expendi­
ture was P4.74 billion short of the programmed P185.0 billion expenditures for the period. Inter­
est payments comprised a third or P59.94 billion of the recorded expenditure.
In financing the deficit, the government had planned to seek more external borrowings as 
domestic interest rates became high. However, the plan was revised and the government ended up 
borrowing huge amounts locally by auctioning more treasury bills and notes than what was 
programmed. For the period, net external financing was recorded at negative P2.159 million 
while net domestic financing was at P6.292 million.
E. External Performance
A deterioration of the country’s external transactions was recorded for the first semester of 
1992. The country netted a surplus of $136 million, a drop of 87.2 percent from the $1,065 mil­
lion surplus recorded last year. This resulted mainly from the widening trade gap and the wor­
sening medium- and long-term loans account. These two accounts countervailed the gains 
arising from increased foreign investment, revaluation adjustments and rescheduling of non­
monetary debt. Without rescheduling, the overall balance of payments (BOP) position would 
have been a deficit of $1,452 million.
As of June 1992, the current account balance posted a deficit of $580 million which was an 
improvement from last year’s deficit of $610 million. The remarkable performance of the non- 
merchandise trade account, which grew by 70.9 percent, accounted for the narrowing of the cur­
rent account deficit. Noteworthy is the surge in inflows of personal income of overseas workers 
and other services which grew by 23.9 percent and 100.7 percent, respectively. The strong per­
formance of the services sector more than offset the deterioration in the merchandise and the 
transfers accounts. The transfers account recorded a net outflow of $437 million, a fall of 5.8 
percent from the figure last year.
During the first half of the year, the merchandise trade balance suffered a deficit of $2,143 
million, 23.76 percent higher than last year’s shortfall of $1,733 million. This can be associated 
with the remarkable growth of imports relative to exports. Imports grew by 12.7 percent while 
exports by only 8.2 percent. Almost half of the growth in imports can be traced to the increase in 
imports of raw materials and intermediate goods. Imports of capital goods posted an appreciable 
increase of 16.2 percent. Year-end growth of merchandise imports in dollar terms is estimated at
14.6 percent.
Despite a fall in exports of forest and petroleum products and other agro-based products (ex­
cluding sugar, coconut, fruits and vegetables), total exports managed to perform better this year 
than in 1991. The credit goes to the expanded exports of manufactured goods, specifically, 
electronics and garments, registering growth rates of 16.4 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively. 
For the whole of 1992, total merchandise exports in dollar terms is expected to rise by 9.1 per­
cent, an acceleration from last year’s growth of eight percent.
Accounting for this year’s poor BOP position is the 97.71 percent decline in total non­
monetary capital. This large fall can be attributed to the more than two-fold decrease in net flow 
of medium- and long-term loans. This account reflects a net outflow of $660 million this year 
compared with a net inflow of $493 million in 1991. The setback in the non-monetary capital ac­
count was due to the huge payments on medium and long-term loans which posted a huge growth 
rate of 83.99 percent relative to outflows posted during the same period last year. This was the 
effect of the implementation of the debt buyback operations last May involving $1.26 billion. 
This substantive outflow of foreign exchange which countered marked improvements in foreign
9investments (20.23 % growth) and short-term capital (24.13 % growth), caused the abrupt fall in 
the capital account during the first six months of this year. Total foreign investments registered a 
remarkable level of $1,221 billion for the first three quarters of 1992 compared to $387.63 mil­
lion last year.
It is expected that by the end of the year, BOP will reach $845 million or a decline of 39.8 
percent from last year. The capital account balance is expected to decline by 43.9 percent, the 
current account deficit by 3.5 percent.
The country’s total foreign exchange liabilities dropped to $28,883 billion at the end of May 
1992, contracting by $1,073 million or 3.58 percent over the level at the end of December 1991. 
The decline was mainly due to the effect of debt reduction schemes of $1,192 million specifically 
of debt buyback amounting to $1,138 million and assignment of credits to Foreign Currency 
Deposit Units (FCDUs) of $39 million. However, these were partly offset by net availments of 
short-term ($84 M) and medium- and long-term ($92 M) loans during the period and by foreign 
exchange rate fluctuations of $263 million.
Based on Central Bank projections as of August 1992, total external debt liabilities is ex­
pected to reach $30,076 billion by the end of the year.
III. PROSPECTS FOR THE ECONOMY (1993-1994)
In 1993, the Ramos administration will continue to consolidate its economic program. Conse­
quently, economic activity will grow only at a modest pace. It will only be towards the latter part 
of 1993 and 1994 that clear signals will be sent to investors as to the direction of the economy. 
This will follow the announcement and implementation of the next medium-term development 
plan. With a more stable macroeconomic and political environment combined with increased 
government spending, growth will be more robust in 1994. Following are brief descriptions of 
sectoral prospects. Detailed forecasts are presented in the Appendix.
A. Economic Growth and Sectoral Performance
If one draws a parallel between the current period and the years following the end of the Mar­
cos regime, then the period 1992-1994 would be equivalent to the period 1986-1988. Since the 
recession was much less severe in 1991 as compared to 1984-1985, recovery will be more drawn 
out this time around (growth will be coming out from a larger base). Moreover, the government 
is working within a tighter fiscal constraint and thus there will be a lesser degree of pump prim­
ing. GDP at constant 1985 prices is expected to grow from 2.7-3.2 percent in 1993 and about 
five percent in 1994. Because of increased remittances from abroad and a reduction in interest 
payments on external debt, GNP will record a higher level but will expand at a similar pace.
Gross capital formation in 1993 is expected to dominate the expenditure sector since the im­
mediate needs of the economy lie in the infrastructure area. Total investment will grow by 8-10 
percent compared to the 4-4.5 percent of total consumption. A similar scenario will unfold in 
1994 with total consumption growing at a faster clip of five percent while investment growth will 
surge to 12-15 percent. Spurred by lower inflation and lower interest rates, the private sector will 
lead the way in the early stages. The government will still be hobbled by a fiscal constraint and 
pump priming activities will not be conducted until the latter part of 1993.
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The industry sector will be the primary beneficiary of investment-led growth and will expand 
by three percent in 1993 and by 7-9 percent in 1994. Unless another major drought occurs, 
agriculture shall benefit from a less distorted exchange rate and post growth rates of 1.5 percent 
and 2.8 percent over the next two years. The services sector shall improve following the trend 
towards greater liberalization and will grow by 3.4 percent in 1993 and by 4.5 percent in 1994.
One should not be lulled into complacency by the seeming upward trend in the growth rates 
of output Preliminary estimates using the PIDS-NEDA Macroeconometric Model show that 
after another year of between 5.5 and six percent growth, the economy will experience balance- 
of-payments difficulties as the trade balance will rapidly deteriorate. Unless this gap can be 
covered, the domestic absorption has to be curtailed anew and growth will likely fall to an 
average of four percent over the period 1996- 1998. This brings to fore the importance of exports 
in the quest for sustainable growth. By developing the export sector, the economy can figurative­
ly kill two birds with one stone: it will have overcome the foreign exchange constraint and at the 
same time increase output growth.
B. Employment
A slight deterioration in employment will accompany the economic recovery in 1993 wherein 
the absolute number of unemployed will increase while the unemployment rate will remain at 
eight percent. Since any significant structural change in the economy is not assumed, there will 
be no increase in the absorptive capacity of the industry sector which is expected to be the focal 
point of economic activity. The increase in employment opportunities will therefore lag behind 
the number of new entrants into the labor force. Moreover, some of the investments will have a 
long gestation period and it will take some time before these projects can reach their employment 
potential. The higher growth in 1994, however, will lead to a much lower unemployment rate at
7.6 percent.
C. Savings and Investment
There will be a significant deterioration in the savings-investment gap because of emphasis 
on investment especially in infrastructure projects. This is expected to be covered by the inflow 
of direct foreign investment. In this regard, the importance of political and macroeconomic 
stability should be underscored. Otherwise policymakers will have to exert greater effort in 
mobilizing domestic resources. One such move is the recent program to tap small savers by issu­
ing instruments denominated at reasonable amounts. The yield on such instruments will be 
slightly above the prevailing inflation rate.
D. Budget, Money and Prices
No drastic shift in the conduct of monetary policy is expected in the short-term. Hence total 
domestic liquidity will grow at 18 percent in 1993 following a 27 percent expansion in 1992. 
This will keep inflation at about eight percent. Only a marginal reduction in the inflation rate 
will be achieved because of the expected depreciation of the peso and the forthcoming hike in 
power rates. In 1994 following the stronger performance of the economy, domestic liquidity will 
expand by 19 percent. Inflation, however, will continue to level off, registering seven percent in
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that year. A higher rate of output growth and a more stable macroeconomy will account for the 
greater price stability.
Recently, attention has been focused on measures to reduce interest rates. Apart from the 
general thrust toward reducing the consolidated public sector deficit, reforms to lessen transaction 
costs of financial intermediaries have been put in the pipeline. Some of these have been long 
delayed, for example scrapping the gross receipts tax.
The fiscal constraint confronting the government is reflected in a cut next year in capital out­
lays measured on an obligations basis. Capital outlays on a cash basis (reported in the appendix), 
however, will increase contributing to a relatively sharp increase in the budget deficit. This can 
be attributed to the expected transfer of some of the Central Bank liabilities to the national 
government and the delayed release of funds to rehabilitate calamity-stricken areas.
Intensified revenue generation and the restructuring of the public debt will enable the govern­
ment to contribute its proper share in infrastructure development in 1994. The deficit for this 
year is expected to decline following the aforementioned measures.
E. External Performance
A more realistic exchange rate will bolster merchandise exports which will grow at a rate 
close to 11 percent which is close to the average for the past two decades. Since there will be no 
significant change in the structure of the economy, implying that the import elasticity of domestic 
supply remains the same, imports will grow at a faster pace. As a result, the trade balance will 
deteriorate to about $4.8 billion in 1993 compared to the estimated $4.1 billion this year.
The expected inflow of foreign investment and higher remittances of overseas workers will 
help cover the gap in the trade balance and as a result there will be a BOP surplus of $1.6 billion 
in 1993. This figure already incorporates reduced interest and amortization payments following 
the accord reached with the country’s creditors.
A similar trend will occur in 1994 with exports receiving a further boost from previous in­
vestment in the trade sector. Merchandise exports will grow by 11 percent with imports rising by 
13 percent The trade balance will be wider at $5.6 billion but again this gap will be adequately 
covered by overseas remittances and inflows of foreign direct investment. The BOP position is 
predicted to remain stationary at a $1.6 billion surplus.
IV. MAJOR ECONOMIC POLICIES, REFORMS 
AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
The prognosis for Philippine economy shows that indeed there is light at the end of the tun­
nel. But how to get there opens the door to skepticism, cynicism and anachronistic debates. One 
thing is for sure: for the Philippines to attain tiger-like performance, it must break the resistance 
threshold which is pulling growth below three percent. This will require a set of policy reforms 
that deals directly with structural issues rather than with the short-run dynamics of adjustment.
In the past, the government’s preoccupation with palliative measures deferred the much 
needed structural reforms in favor of quick fixes. This has resulted to countervailing policy
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proposals, distortions in both the system of incentives and regulatory regime, and the eventual 
compromise of social welfare in favor of parochial economic interests.
This section starts off from where last year’s review ended. Emphasis is placed on the internal 
consistency of the set of policy reforms. More importantly, the timing and sequencing of these 
reforms are more appropriately discussed.
A. Recent Developments for Macroeconomic Policies
The current turn of events have baffled critics of the government. A cursory look at the 
economic indicators explains why. First, the country’s financing gap is at a comfortable level. 
Second, the level of reserves continues to pile up and the value of the currency continues to ap­
preciate. Third, the rate of inflation has already been checked at single digit level. Economic 
slowdown, however, persists despite efforts to energize the lethargic economy.
These indicators underscore the contradictory nature of the present set of macroeconomic 
policies. While targets are being attained, the economy remains weak. If this is to be corrected, 
policy directives that contribute to this dismal performance will have to be reversed.
The first thing that will have to be corrected is the monetarist approach to inflation. This 
view looks at inflation as a case of more money running after a limited supply of goods. Under 
condition of excess capacity however, a growth in monetary aggregate will provide business with 
credit which will eventually push investment and yield greater output. This will counteract the 
growth in money supply averting any price spiral. More importantly, the growth in money will 
increase the supply of funds and decrease the interest rate. This will cut the interest expense on 
public debt, reduce the need to borrow, and induce a further cut in the prime lending rate which 
will again encourage private investors to produce more output.
Moreover, inflation is closely associated with the domestic costs of imports and not with the 
growth of money. The domestic costs of imports are affected by fluctuations in the exchange 
rate, terms of trade and oil prices. In this regard, the government can control inflation through 
either one of the following: (1) an overvaluation of the currency; (2) an improvement in the terms 
of trade; or (3) a reduction in the duties levied on oil imports.
In the Philippines, the government used "tight money policy" coupled with a system of fixed 
exchange rate to control prices. This strategy artificially props up the return on peso- 
denominated investments as against dollar-denominated investments. In effect, it substituted 
high interest rates in exchange for a manageable level of prices. This contributed to the credit 
crunch which has depleted the production capacity of the economy.
In addition, the resulting inefficiency in resource allocation (imports have risen much faster 
than exports) has compounded the balance of payments problem and compelled the government 
to devalue the currency time and again. This resulted to a crawling-peg system of exchange rate. 
In the aggregate, the inflationary impact of this system was amplified by the multiplicative nature 
of expectations.
The liberalization of regulations governing the foreign exchange transactions is therefore a 
step towards strengthening the economy, in particular, the trade sector. This will give export in­
dustries a competitive advantage in the world market. Adjunct to this, as individuals switch their
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expenditure pattern, the inefficiency in resource allocation as well as the balance of payments gap 
will be addressed. However, there will be a general ascent in prices owing to the increased 
domestic costs of imports and the rise in the prices of non-tradables. To ease up the pressure on 
prices, the duties on imports will have to be immediately removed. This will mitigate any infla­
tionary effect of a depreciation in the currency.
In this regard, lifting the ceiling on base money is important since this will reduce the interest 
rate and the interest expense of public debt. On the average, a one percent decrease in the interest 
rate saves the government at least P2 billion in interest payments. This will offset any foregone 
revenue arising from the lowering of trade taxes.
Furthermore, the recent appreciation of the currency does not justify government interven­
tion. This is a transient event that arose mainly from the inflow of either the so called "hot" or 
"fright" capital. Consequently, a substantial amount of these flows came in as deposits, treasury 
bill placements, or shares of stock. Hence, they are speculative in nature unlike investment in 
equities. With a more liberal growth in the money supply however, speculation will be 
diminished and this will temper the overvaluation of the currency.
In the meantime, the government can provide exporters with various instruments to hedge 
against currency risks. First, they can create forward and futures market. Second, they can work 
for the diversification of the country’s export market. Third, they can support organizational in­
tegration to minimize currency risk.
The third issue pertains to the losses of the Central Bank arising from the foreign exchange 
swap and forward-cover arrangements. As of December 1991, accumulated losses stand at P324 
billion and this accounts for an average of 41 percent of the consolidated public sector deficit 
during the past six years. Because of this huge shortfall, the government has been forced to issue 
greater amount of treasury bill to cover the gap. This has pushed up interest rates further and this 
is a major factor contributing to the under-investment of the Philippine economy. Treasury bill is­
suances surpass bank loans to industry by as much as 30 percent. Moreso, the Central Bank is 
compelled to intervene in the foreign exchange market for fear of increasing its foreign exchange 
liabilities.
In this regard, the various legislative remedies which propose to increase the bank’s capital 
and transfer its liabilities to the government are good bookkeeping measures that can clean the 
bank’s account. However, the issue of transparency and accountability of monetary policy has 
yet to be resolved. In the event that government appropriates a budget to cover the shortfall, 
there will have to be legislative guarantee that the CB cannot enter into a similar transaction in 
the future. More importantly, multilateral institutions will have to help in bridging the financial 
requirements of such a transfer.
Another important issue is the slow domestic resource mobilization in the country. In 
general, this arises from the high intermediation cost which directly stems from the tight 
monetary regime as well as the oligopolistic structure of the banking industry. To correct this 
situation, the reserve requirement will have to be lowered and government flotation of treasury 
bills and notes will have to be reduced. Furthermore, the dealership for government securities 
will have to be expanded and the denominations of bids reduced. This will allow small savers to 
benefit from the risk free and high return asset. It will also increase bid prices and lower interest
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rate. Likewise, the move to join the two stock exchanges as well as the fiscal incentives granted 
for public listing can further strengthen the domestic capital market. Coupled with the simplified 
local branching requirements and the lifting of entry regulations for foreign banks, domestic and 
foreign savings will prosper.
B. Structural Adjustment: Privatization, Investment and Trade Liberalization
The recovery effort since 1986 illustrates the government’s attempt to revive the economy 
based on the same industrial and trade structure. The only difference is that now, it acknow­
ledges the need to open up the economy to foreign investments. However, this falls short of 
being a complete reform. If this effort is to bear fruit, certain constraints still have to be lifted 
and certain incentives have to be granted soon.
The principal requirements that will have to be immediately met is the provision of adequate 
infrastructure especially power, transport and communications, and water control. These factors 
feed directly into the cost structure of industry such that no amount of liberalization effort can at­
tract sizeable investments without these support facilities. It can be noted that this lethargic state 
of infrastructure is an aftermath of government cutback in capital outlays. As a proportion of the 
total budget, infrastructure spending went down from 26 percent in 1986 to 18 percent in 1991.
To mitigate this difficulty, the government is banking on the build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
scheme to construct several power projects. However, the sources of financing as well as the 
complex array of negotiations still remain cloudy. Hence, the government will have to come out 
with a clear and concise guideline on pricing, capacity fees, and currency risks. Moreso, as in the 
case of the Navotas facility under Hopewell, the issue of multilateral financing of BOT projects 
will have to be thoroughly reviewed. This is so since multilateral agencies such as the ADB have 
limited exposure to each country and following the principle of additionality, these private en­
deavors may crowd out worthy government-led projects.
Equally important is the need to keep the economy open to foreign investments, goods and 
competition. In this light, the move to reduce the tariff rates will have to be fast-tracked and 
made more comprehensive -  E.O. 470 merely reduces the tariff rate from an average of 25 per­
cent to 21 percent within a five year period. E.O. 8, which sought to replace quantitative restric­
tions with tariffs, can be viewed in a similar vein although it is less comprehensive in nature. In 
the aggregate, it will reduce tariff levels from 21 percent to 20 percent. On the other hand, the 
administration can use the promulgation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the estab­
lishment of the North American Free Trade Zone (NAFTA) and the forthcoming European Com­
mon Market as avenues to convince intransigent protectionist interests of the benefits of greater 
openness. In addition, the various complementary bills to the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 
will have to be immediately passed. These measures will give foreigners access to land either in 
the form of a renewable long- term lease or direct ownership. However, the administration as 
well as the regulation of imports will have to be strengthened without prejudice to free trade.
More importantly, export promotion will have to be prioritized through aggressive marketing; 
provision of non-countervailable subsidies to exporters, i.e., tax credits, duty drawbacks, ac­
celerated depreciation; opening up of rediscount window for export financing; and setting up sup­
port institution for technology, product standards, design and skills training.
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In this regard, the services sector has a competitive advantage to qualify as the lead industry 
in the promotion of exports. First, the country has sufficient number of highly qualified profes­
sionals that can handle business-related services such as legal, finance, advertising or computer 
consultancy. For instance, the Philippines now compete internationally for software design and 
data encoding services. However, as pointed out by a business executive, infrastructure support 
such as telecommunications system will have to be expanded and modernized. Regulatory con­
trols such as franchising will have to be liberalized and made more open to foreign investments. 
Second, the archipelagic nature of Philippine geography has bestowed the country with unlimited 
natural sites for recreation. Hand in hand with the boom of tourism in East Asia, the country can 
capture a sizeable chunk of this market. All that is needed is that tourist facilities be upgraded to 
world class standard. More importantly, peace and order will also have to be maintained as the 
industry is sensitive to perception.
Finally, the government will have to assume fiscal responsibility for development. It must 
not hesitate to provide investors with conducive and efficient business environment. This entails 
broadening the fiscal resource base through efficient collection and enforcement of tax laws. 
Similarly, efforts at privatization will have to be accelerated. In this regard, it is worth examining 
whether a simple sell off at a discount is better than a joint-venture arrangement. Under the latter 
plan, the government will submit the physical assets of state enterprises as equity and issues par­
ticipation bonds to prospective investors. This is a better alternative since the government will 
share in the profit of rehabilitated corporations, aside from the investment inflows it can attract.
C. Political Economy Issues
This paper is being written nearly 120 days after the inauguration of President Ramos. There 
is a consensus that the new president is taking a more hands-on approach in governance and this 
has bred hope for quicker response to the needs of the economy. However, this is no easy task. 
Economic reforms entail adjustment costs and sacrifices. In this regard, the following develop­
ment issues confront the current administration.
First, a consensus on the alternative set of social policy must be brokered among the different 
sectors of society. This will entail a "bottoms-up" approach to the decisionmaking process, 
where government undertakes consultation on major policy pronouncements. Underlying this 
consensus-building is the equal sharing of responsibility as well as the egalitarian distribution of 
costs of adjustments arising from this set of policies. The establishment of the National Unifica­
tion Commission is a major step towards establishing a social consensus. A noted columnist, 
however, has criticized the administration for applying the politics of transaction instead of the 
needed politics of transformation. The implication is that the administration may have com­
promised its program of government by negotiating deals with existing power blocs.
Second, a strong representation for technical, trade, institutional, financial and other forms of 
assistance will have to be made by a panel of government and private sector representatives, to 
the international community. This will usher in unlimited amount of goodwill which can be used 
during the difficult period of transition. Emphasis can be given to trade markets and concession 
that can be obtained.
Third, to mitigate the difficulty brought about by economic change, the government has to 
grant safety nets to the displaced members of society. This will require large outlay for social
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services, i.e., nutrition program for children, negative taxation for selected sectors, the provision 
of income additives, and the granting of food subsidy or discount coupons to the marginalized 
members of society.
Fourth, there must be a continuing effort to equalize access to human, capital and other 
resources. This can be achieved through the decentralization of business opportunities consistent 
with resource mapping, the provision of soft loans for backyard business, the recognition of the 
role of non-government organization, the promotion of education and relevant skills training, the 
provision of adequate health care facilities, and the redistribution of various resources such as 
land.
In this light, the principle of "resource as a public trust" will have to be upheld. Under this 
principle, a resource is a common good and its use should serve to promote both the individual 
and the social needs of society. To the extent that individual disposition of resources cease to 
conform to social welfare, the custody rights of an individual can be appropriated.
Fifth, priority will have to be given to people empowerment. This will enable people to have 
wider choices in all sphere of human activity. Foremost to empowerment is the development of 
human resources. This entails putting up social institutions and systems whereby the accumula­
tion of specialized assets and skills will be enhanced. In this context, the government will have to 
concentrate on technical-vocational education, out-of-school apprenticeship, and on-the-job train­
ing. Specifically, the crafts where Filipinos have a natural edge are in furniture- making, jewelry- 
making, embroidery, fashion, footwear and leatherwear. In addition, the government must also 
aim to strengthen the advance skills in agricultural technology, electomechanics, metal fabrica­
tion, industrial chemistry, advertising and computer programming. To achieve this leapfrogging, 
the goverment must recommend a deregulated wage policy where wage differential across in­
dustry rations the available skills to its most productive use. Moreso, subsidy to cover the cost of 
training will have to be extended in view of the externality problem in human resource develop­
ment.
Finally, social policy will have to emphasize the complementary roles of efficiency and equi­
ty. In the recently-issued PIDS report on the Crisis of Poverty Project, one major finding was 
that the principal factors that led to unsustainable growth are the same causes of poverty and the 
inequitable distribution of income. Thus, efforts to enhance productivity will have to be pursued. 
This can be attained through the streamlining of regulatory and administrative control, the 
promotion of competition, the strengthening of anti-trust laws, the encouragement of science and 
technology, and the support of industry with high linkages with other sectors of the economy.
V. CONCLUSION
Like its predecessor, the Ramos administration has inherited an economy that is in a state of 
recession. Despite this discouraging condition, policymakers must nevertheless take full ad­
vantage of the stabilized macroeconomic conditions. The best way to do this is to take more con­
crete steps towards liberalizing the economy and promoting a healthier business climate.
As mentioned in last year’s outlook paper, the path towards sustainable growth has been 
made sharper over the years. The new administration though must muster enough political will
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to implement the needed reforms; it must take courage from the examples set forth in other 
developing countries (e.g. the Salinas government in Mexico).
One critical aspect that has not been discussed in detail is the effect of the peace and order 
situation on investor confidence. Here the military background of the President will be put into 
good use. But again clear and credible policies must be instituted to minimize the spread of 
criminal activities otherwise people will dismiss government programs along this line as mere 
grandstanding and perceptions of cover-ups will abound.
The next five years offer a myriad of challenges and opportunities. It is obvious from their 
pronouncements that policymakers are cognizant of the requirements of sustainable growth. The 
main task of the government then is to provide the leadership that will see much needed reforms 
implemented and institutionalized. In the process, a social consensus will have been built and the 
Philippines will finally find the road to nationhood.
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A P P E N D IX  
( a s  of 2 7  Ja n u a ry  1 9 9 3 )
I T E M 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
P O P U L A T IO N  (M n ; a s  o f 1 J u ly )  a/ 60.1 60.7 62.1 64.3 65.6 67.0
E M P L O Y M E N T  (T h o u s a n d  p e rso n s)
Agricum /e 9857 10192 10354 10559 10793 11074
Industry 3448 3388 3447 3550 3719 3925
Services 8544 8952 9379 9777 10103 10446
Total employed 21849 22532 23160 23866 24614 25445
Unemployed 2009 1993 2029 2080 2131 2101
Unemployment Rate
N A T IO N A L  A C C O U N T S  (B n  P e s o s ; c y )
At Constant 1986 Prices
8.4 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.6
G D P  by Industrial Origin 698.4 717.3 712.5 713.3 733.1 769.3
Agrieultixe 160,0 160.7 162.2 161.9 164.2 168.8
Industry 251.6 258.1 250.2 250.4 257.6 275.3
Manufacturing 178.4 183.9 183.1 183,5 188.6 198.8
Non-m anufacturing 73.2 74.2 67.1 66,9 69.0 76.5
Services 288.8 298.4 300.1 301,0 314.2 325.2
G D P  a t co n sta n t m p 698.4 717.3 712.5 713.3 733.1 769.3
Net factor income from abroad -8 .7 1.7 8.0 13.6 14.1 14.0
G N P  a t co n sta n t m p 689.7 718.9 720.5 726.8 747.3 783,3
G D P  (c o n sta n t m p ) 
se cto ra l sh a res
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agricuttue 22.9 22.4 22.8 22.7 22.4 21.9
Industry 36.0 36.0 35.1 35.1 35.1 35.8
Services 41.1 41.6 42.1 42.2 42,5 42.3
G D P  g ro w th  rate  (m p ) 6.0 2.7 -0 .9 0.1 2.8 4.9
G R  AgricultLre 3.0 0.5 0.7 -0 .2 1.5 2.8
G R  Industry 8.1 2.6 -3 .1 0.1 2.9 6.9
G R  Manufacturing 6.1 3.1 -0 .4 0.2 2.8 5.4
G R  Services 6.0 4,0 0.0 0.3 3.4 4.5
G D P  a t c u rre n t m a rket p ric e s  (B n  P esos; c y ) 925.2 1070.9 1243.9 1357,1 1516.9 1715.0
Net factor Income from abroad -1 1 .3 2.3 14.0 21.4 18.0 7.6
G N P  a t c u rre n t m p 913.8 10732 1257.9 1378.5 1534.9 1722.7
G D P  at current m p (Mn US£) 42561.6 44050.0 45266.2 52114.0 56180.9 62365.0
E x c h a n g e  Rate (P e so s/ U S $ ; A v e ra g e  of p e rio d ) 21.74 24.31 27.48 26.04 27.00 27.50
Implicit G D P  deflator (1985=100) (derived) 132.47 149.31 174.58 190.27 206.91 222,95
G R  G D P  deflator 8.7 12.7 16.9 9.0 8.7 7.8
C o n s u m e r P rice  In d ex, P h ilipp in es 125.79 141.73 166.80 182.02 198.09 213.47
G R C P I. 1985=100 
C o n s u m e r P rice  Index. M e tro  M anila  (1 9 8 5 « 1 0 0 )











E x p e n d itu re  o n  G D P  (c ia te n t  m p ) 925.2 1070.9 1243.9 1357.1 1516.9 1715.0
T o ta l co n su m p tio n 734.7 875.9 1043.3 1177.9 13342 1511.9
Private consumption 649.3 767,1 916.2 1031.1 1169.3 1316.7
Government consumption 85.4 108.8 127.1 146.8 184.9 195.2
T o ta l investm ent 202.1 241.3 248.6 293.2 344,8 421.2
Gross fixed capital formation 193.2 234.2 246.4 290.7 341.8 417.6
Increase in stocks 8.9 7.1 2.2 2.5 2,9 3.6
E x po rts  of g o o d s  &  se rvice s 263.9 299.2 367,5 430.2 497.2 562.6
Less: Im p o rts  of g o o d s  &  se rvices 280.1 358.5 391.9 452.6 543.0 639,8
Statistical discrepancy 4.6 13.0 -2 3 .6 -9 1 .4
713.3




E x p e n diture  o n  G D P  (c o n sta n t m p ) 698.4 717.3 712.5 713.3 733.1 769.3
T o ta l co n su m p tio n 557.4 588,8 601.1 620,6 645.5 677.1
Private consumption 504.6 531.8 543.7 560.6 584.2 610.5
Government consumption 52.8 57.0 57.4 59.9 61.3 66.6
T o ta l investm ent 153.9 162.6 140.4 149,6 161.6 181.9
Gross fixed capital formation 146.2 157.0 139,3 148.4 160.5 180.4
Increase in stocks 7.7 5,6 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
E x po rts  of g o o d s  &  se rvice s 217.0 219.7 235.6 251.7 266.6 260.5
Le ss: Im p orts of g o o d s  A  se rvices 244.6 269.1 264.0 305,7 336.1 366.7
Statistical discrepancy 14.7 15.2 -0 .7 -2 .9 -4 .7 -3 .5
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I T E M 1989 1990 1991 1992 1 993 1994
E x p e n d itu re  o n  G D P  (re a l g ro w th  rate s) 6.0 2.7 -0 .7 0.1 2.8 4.9
T o ta l c o n s u m p tio n 5.1 5.6 2.1 3.2 4.0- 4.9
Private consumption 5.0 5.4 2.2 3.1 4.2 4.5
Governm ent consumption 5.6 8.1 0.7 4.3 2.3 8.8
T o ta l in ve stm e n t 23.6 5.7 -1 3 .7 6.5 8.2 12.4
E x p o rts  o f g o o d s  &  se rvic e s 10.7 1.3 7.2 6.8 5.9 5.2
Le ss: Im p o rts  o f g o o d s  &  se rvic e s 15.2 10.0 -1 .9 15.8 9.9 9.1
In ve stm e n t F in a n c in g  (c u rre n t p ric e s )
G ro s s  d o m e s tic  cap ita l fo rm atio n 202.1 241.3 248.6 293.2 344.8 421.2
Gross national saving 179.2 197.3 214.6 200.7 200.7 210.8
Gross domestic saving b/ 190.5 195.0 200.6 179.2 182.7 203.1
G R  GDI 37.0 19.4 3.0 18.0 17.6 22.2
G R T C 16.4 19.2 19.1 12.9 13.3 13.3
GD I as %  of G D P 21.8 22.5 20.0 21.6 22,7 24.6
G D S  as %  of G D P 20.6 16.2 16.1 13.2 12.0 11.S
G N S  as %  of G D P 19.4 18.4 17.3 14.8 13.2 12.3
Resource G a p  (G D S -G D I ) -1 .3 -4 .3 -3 .9 - 8 .4 -1 0 .7 -1 2 .7
P er C a p ita  G D P  (P e s o s )
Current prices 15393.7 17642.5 20030.1 21099.1 23123.3 25597.6
Constant 1985 prices 11620 11816 11473 11089 11175 11481
G R  per capita constant G D P 3.6 1.7 -2 .9 — 3.3 0.8 2.7
B A L A N C E  O F  P A Y M E N T S  (U S $  M n ; c y ) c/
Merchandise exports, fob 7821 8186 8840 9710 10831 12039
Merchandise Imports, fob -1 0 4 1 9 — 12206 -1 20 51 -1 3 8 0 7 -1 56 41 -1 7 6 6 9
T ra d e  b a la n ce -2 5 9 8 -4 0 2 0 -3 2 1 1 -4 0 9 8 -4 8 1 0 -5 63 1
Other goods, services a nd Income 312 611 1351 2120 2503 2622
Credit 4586 4842 5624 6654 7489 8249
Debit -4 2 7 4 -4 2 3 1 -4 2 7 3 -4 5 3 4 -4 9 8 6 -5 6 2 7
Unrequited transfer 830 714 827 908 966 1022
Private 473 357
Official 357 357
C u rre n t b a la n ce -1 4 5 6 -2 6 9 5 -1 0 3 3 -1 0 7 0 -1 3 4 2 -1 9 8 7
Services & Transfers.net
G ro w th  rates
Merchandise exports 10.6 4.7 6.0 9.8 11.6 11.1
Merchandise Imports 27.7 17.2 -1 .3 14.6 13.3 13.0
A s  %  of G D P
Merchandise exports 18.4 18.6 19.5 18.6 19.3 19.3
Merchandise imports 24.5 27.7 26.6 26.5 27.8 28.3
Current Account — 3.4 -6 .1 -2 .3 -2 .1 -2 .4 -3 .2
Invisibles 1142 1325 2178 3028 3469 3644
G R  Invisibles 64.3 16.0 64.4 39.0 14.5 5.1
Merch. exports at constant 1985 prices 138216 148515
G R  MX 13.0 7.5
Merch. imports at constant 1985 prices 231100 241252
G R  MM 24.9 4.4
Unit value index (1 9 8 5 -1 0 0 ; period averages) d/
Exports 123.0 134.0
G R  UVIX 0.8
Imports 98.0 123.0
G R  UVIM 5.4
M O N E Y  A N D  B A N K IN G  (M n  P e s o s ; e o p ) e/
M o n e y  s u p p ly  ( M l ) 78530 89012 101374 126799 151752 177462
Currency in circulation 52823 61921 69394
Dem and deposits 25707 27091 31980
Q u a s i -m o n e y 172561 208295 242683
M o n e y  s u p p ly  (T o ta l L iq u id ity ) 263221 312574 357317 456836 538223 638844
G R M 1 31.5 13.3 13.9 25.1 19.7 16.9
G R  M2 25.9 18.7 14.3 27,9 17.8 18.7
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I T E M  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
GOVERNM ENT FINANCE (Mn Pesos; fy end 31 Dec) 
Central Government
C u rre n t re v e n u e 140246 174199 222489 267974 279745 317185.3
Taxes 121352 1 Si 700 198281 221674 252045 288785.3
N o n -ta x e s 16694 22499 24208 46300 27700 28400
Current expenditure 127180 180152 205000 272800 305900 324300.0
C u rre n t surplus/deficit 13068 -5 9 5 3 17489 -4 8 2 6 -2 6 1 5 5 -7 1 1 5
Capital receipts 533 4322 4716
Capital expenditure 27364 38236 53755 52900 59500 76100.0
C a p ita l a c c o u n t  surplus/defic it -2 68 31 -3 3 9 1 4 -4 9 0 3 9
Net lending 1589 2156 833 1500 2200 2200.0
N o n -b u d g e ta ry  surplus/deficit , - -
O v e ra ll surplus/defic it -1 5 3 5 4 -4 2 0 2 3 -3 2 3 8 3 -5 9 2 2 6 -8 7 8 5 5 -8 5 4 1 5
F in a n c in g
Domestic borrowing 3144 33068 ‘ 16571
Foreign borrowing & grants 12752 6507 13637
Use of cash balances -5 4 2 2448 2175
A s  %  of G D P
G o v ’t expenditure (current +  capital) 16.7 20.4 20.8 24.0 24.1 23.3
Total revenue (current +  capital) 15.2 16.7 18.3 19.7 18.4 18.5
Overall surplus/deficit -1 .7 -3 .9 -2 .6 -4 .4 -5 .8 -5 .0
Overall surplus/deficit (excl grants)
E X T E R N A L  IN D E B T E D N E S S  (U S $  M n ; c y )
T o ta l o u ts ta n d in g  a n d  d is b u rs e d 28469 30457 30640 32500 33000.0
L o n g -t e r m 23340 25114
Public and publicly guaranteed 22597 24108
Private non -gu ara nte ed 743 1006.Q
S h o r t -t e r m 3952 4431.0
U s e  o f IM F  c re d it 1177 912.0
T o ta l D e b t S e rv ice 3234 2822 3040.0 2740.0 2500.0
Principal amortization (L T) 893 - 752 1170 960 900
Interest payments (L T, S T ) 2061 1626
IM F repurchases & charges 280 444
E x p o rts  of g o o d s  & se rvic e s 12767 13290
D e b t— se rvic e  ratio 25.3 21.2 21.6 18.9 15.7
Note: Historical data taken from Kl except B O P (IPS) and Debt (W D T),
a/ Intercensal estimates except for the 1960 figure which is actual census results, 
b/ Estimated by A D B  staff as G D P  less private and government consumption expenditures, 
cl 1969 data are only from January to November.
d/ For 1976, base period is 1972. Unit value Indexes of imports are based on C IF  value while those of 
exports are based on F O B  value, 
e/ Data for 1 9 8 3 -8 9  were revised to incorporate the new expanded commercial banks' concept which includes 
the Land Bank of the Philippines.
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